1	encompass the parties in this proceeding and
2	the Enforcement Bureau, in that negotiation,
3	the Bureau took no position as to what
4	compensation the companies would offer Mr.
5	Waugh for past services rendered or anything
6	else that he sought compensation for, except
7	that stock not be issued to him in the form of
8	a voting trust as part and parcel of the
9	settlement, or henceforth, if we were to be
0	able to resolve this proceeding.
1	The reason for that is several
2	fold. One, the companies themselves did not
3	want to issue stock to Mr. Waugh after the
4	negotiations on their business issues had
5	concluded. And it's within the licensees
6	purview to decide what happens to their
7	licenses and the stock interest
8	JUDGE SIPPEL: I'll talk to Mr.
9	Austin
0	MS. SINGH: Of course. Of course.
1	JUDGE SIPPEL: But what about from
2	the Bureau's standpoint?

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most importantly, leads

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MS. SINGH: From the Bureau's standpoint, your Honor. the pattern misconduct that the order to show cause alleges was predicated in large part upon the appearance that stock had been issued to Mr. Waugh for his benefit through this voting trust, that it constituted -- constitutes -a significant chunk of stock in the company, that that interest was not disclosed to the the Commission, that Bureau nor to beneficiary of that voting trust is convicted felon, and that that same convicted felon appeared to be acting as a consultant for the very companies in which he held stock, and appeared to be running the day-to-day affairs of a very small closely held starter corporation.

So in our minds, if we were to settle the case and conclude the settlement with a fact pattern that goes against the licensees' wishes, number one, but two, and most importantly, leads us right back to the

fact pattern that led to this hearing being designated in the first place, at least in the Bureau's understanding, it seems like that would be a paramount concern to the Bureau and that we would certainly not sign on to some sort of resolution that permits that.

We would be right back in the place where we started where we can't trust that the voting trust, despite its terms, or despite its forms, or despite the parties' good faith, is in fact only a voting trust for Mr. Waugh's benefit and that it won't be used to conceal some sort of sham arrangement between the parties as to his level of involvement or control within the company.

JUDGE SIPPEL: Well, under that -if I'm listening to that scenario, the voting
trust is set up, basically it's set up by the,
by the issuing company, right, or at least
under the direction of the issuing company, I
mean, the stock issuing company, correct, or
not correct?

1 MR. GUSKEY: This is Mr. Guskey. 2 The creation formation of the trust would be 3 the responsibility of Mr. Waugh. JUDGE SIPPEL: So it doesn't exist 4 5 The trust does not exist yet or it does 6 exist? 7 MR. GUSKEY: It does not, sir. 8 MS. SINGH: Actually, your Honor, 9 that's a matter of contention in the record 10 and the Bureau would just like to reserve the 11 right to comment on the substance if 12 becomes necessary to do so. 13 JUDGE SIPPEL: Thank you. 14 MR. GUSKEY: But as far as 15 Preferred's position is, the trust has not 16 been formed and been, in Mr. Waugh's 17 deposition, it also -- he personally confirms 18 that the trust has not been formed. So in a 19 sense there is, he has a contention on the 20 matter -- that their view of things, but as 21 far as it being, again a matter between a

company and a consultant, neither of those

1 parties have any disagreement as far as the 2 trust, in fact not being formed. 3 JUDGE SIPPEL: Well, do you think 4 it's doable? 5 GUSKEY: Your MR. Honor, unfortunately, we do not. б And there's one 7 thing to clarify as far as Mr. Waugh's claim to this stock, even though -- it dates back 8 9 over ten years. It's not something that has 10 accrued over ten years. 11 His claim is that based on, 12 work performed many, many, many years ago, he 13 was entitled to what he was claiming. 14 speak for itself that over ten years has gone 15 passed without that matter being resolved. 16 far as his current status, As 17 again, according to Mr. Waugh's deposition, he 18 indicated, you know, in his deposition, under 19 oath in January of 2009, that when asked by 20 the Enforcement Bureau the status of 21 relationship with the firm was his and

compensation, he indicated that it was -- and

I'll quote, he says, that is high likely probability litigation and regarding litigation it was a virtual certainty. But the point of that is, it has been a longstanding matter of contention as to Mr. Waugh's compensation.

JUDGE SIPPEL: Do you think it's worth -- yes, but do you think it's worthwhile sitting down and having serious negotiations about it? Go ahead.

MR. GUSKEY: In answering that, your Honor, again, this is Mr. Guskey, as -when you started the clock in March of '09, the point of which the EB and the various parties entered or pursued what would be serious negotiations, referred to as company knew at that point that a resolution of the matter with Waugh despite it had been pending for plus would ten years appropriate and necessary to resolve in order to abide again transparency and clarity giving the FCC regarding Preferred's relationship

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with Mr. Waugh.

At that point, we endeavored for many, many months, you know, to, to have those negotiations. There is a track record of correspondence, and in that process, the company, you know, prior to that had decided that the parent company did not want Mr. Waugh to own stock in the company directly or through a trust or any way shape or form.

That was a decision made by the company and then the company has a grievance for doing that, but consequently -- Mr. Waugh believes he has -- claims for specific performance of stock. He could take that to civil court. Putting that aside, we tried for many, many months, and you can read --

JUDGE SIPPEL: Well, I'm not trying to -- Mr. Guskey, I don't -- I don't -- think of me in this term, I had just walked in the door. I don't care what happened before. I really don't, except that for background purposes to understand what's going on here.

But my, my question is, let's say today is a new day, okay, a brand-new day, does it make -- is it, is there any possibility that you and Mr. Waugh can sit down and work out some finality to this, this issue about compensation?

MR. GUSKEY: I understand your Honor's question and I wish I could say that, that I would be personally hopeful that it would occur. Again, I look, you know, we have tried that for many, many months, and even there were times where we thought we were close to a resolution.

And one of the things that really, I believe, you know, has bearing on, you know, reaching the impasse, and now we're approaching the FCC to agate the settlement separate from Mr. Waugh regarding this action. It goes back to, to a number of communications in June of '09, at which point in a memorandum — from the company's perspective, we didn't want him to be a stockholder.

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JUDGE SIPPEL: Okay.

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MR. GUSKEY: However, but what we did offer was that he would receive, you know, some amount, but it would be at an equivalency calculation so that he would not be a stockholder, but in the end, its economic benefit would be as if he were a stockholder. And, again, there would be a distinction there because, we again, you know, will not issue Mr. Waugh stock directly through a trust.

We communicated that through Mr. Silva to Mr. Waugh, and it was a -- again, conversation, as well as letters, which are available for your review. We got a response from Mr. Silva back, and is a memorandum, which he attached, again, the Waugh statement of settlement that he filed last week that be Waugh appeared to indicated that Mr. compensation that would be amenable to something other than the stock that he had previously been demanding.

JUDGE SIPPEL: All right. You

1 finally said something that I, that makes sense. All of this other -- it doesn't help 2 3 what I'm trying to accomplish today. 4 understand. It sounds like there's been a lot 5 of frustrating, either the term, negotiations, compensations, back-and-forth about this that 6 7 makes it, that has made it very frustrating 8 for both sides for whatever reason. 9 I don't care who's at fault here. 10 That's not the point. But it sounds to me now 11 -- but now you said something that rings a 12 little bit of interest here that there is an 13 amount of money that might, that this thing 14 might go away. I mean, in other words, give 15 up on the stock, take money, and go. I'm 16 asking Mr. Silva this question. 17 MR. GUSKEY: Let me finish 18 comment and I'm certain Mr. Silva can step in 19 and provide, you know, his --20 JUDGE SIPPEL: Well, his client --21 what would -- would his client take money 22 instead of stock? Isn't that what you're

basically saying?

MR. GUSKEY: Yes, again, as opposed to this calling it money, the reason is as a starter corporation and keeping within the spirit of Mr. Waugh's original involvement that he could be compensated and potentially very handsomely based on the consent of the company.

And so to resolve it or resolve it in a monetary -- insured dollars, we did not pursue that or break that idea because that was like he, him individually, had other individuals who invested in the company, you know, only stock and so forth. So we came up with what we thought was the best resolution, i.e., one, where he didn't get stock because, again, irrespective of the EB's position, the company had made that decision that we did not want him, and this is not, you know, and other shareholders and other folks involved that, that has made a clear voice.

And we, again, created a vehicle

by which Mr. Waugh would receive future compensation based on a calculation that would be tied to a number of shares. The number of shares is really mechanism for the а calculation. We proposed that, again, to Mr. Waugh through Mr. Silva, and again, Mr. Silva sent a memorandum back indicating that they were open to that type of concept and that they were wanting to look at drafting, Mr. Silva indicated that earlier that they were going to be drafting an executory contract, was the term they used, for our review.

We, you know, without digressing we never received that, but we were, we were to that as far conceptual open as а resolution. And in saying that, he announced that we had offered, which was much less than the entirety of the claim that Mr. Waugh was looking for. He was looking for a total of approximately 2.2 million shares. We offered the equivalency of 800,000 shares.

While that was pending in mid-to-

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late June, and we were expecting to -- and a part of our efforts, we drafted a letter of intent with those specific terms with the 800,000 shares, et cetera equivalency for Mr. Waugh and we were expecting to hear back from Mr. Waugh via Mr. Silva.

Several weeks went by and hadn't heard anything and the next thing we have was a conference call on July 8 in which Mr. Waugh completely reversed any acceptance or possibility of acceptance of a non-stock resolution to the business dispute and reiterated his, the entirety of his original claim, as well as the add-on, as Ms. Singh described again in the July 8 letter.

And at that point, we knew we were at an impasse that despite several months of effort and progress and clearly the documents provided, you know, in the record a particular memo from Mr. Silva. He indicated that we were making progress so that one of the --

JUDGE SIPPEL: What's the date of

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1	that memo roughly?
2	MR. GUSKEY: The memo
3	unfortunately, the memo is not dated itself,
4	although, it was, I believe June 5th or 6th in
5	that period.
6	JUDGE SIPPEL: Of this year?
7	MR. GUSKEY: Of this year. And it
8	is attached. It's an attachment to the
9	settlement fact statement submitted by Mr.
10	Waugh on August 28.
11	JUDGE SIPPEL: I understand. Okay.
12	Okay. Okay. Okay. The fact statement of Mr.
13	now, go ahead. Ms. Singh is very
14	interested in interjecting something here and
15	I'm going to let her do it. Go ahead.
16	MS. SINGH: Thank you, your Honor.
17	Just two things. One, the Enforcement
18	Bureau's position is entirely consistent with
19	what Mr. Guskey just laid out on behalf of
20	Preferred, and we had no objection to the
21	forms of compensation that Preferred offered

settlement negotiations

Mr.

Waugh during

1	during this formal stretch of time that were
2	talking about, March 2009 to August 2009.
3	JUDGE SIPPEL: Okay. Thank you.
4	- That's important. Thank you.
5	We're back to you now, Mr. Silva.
6	MR. SILVA: My turn?
7	JUDGE SIPPEL: Your turn, sir.
8	MR. SILVA: Okay.
9	JUDGE SIPPEL: But it sounds to me
10	like they want to give you money and it's just
11	a question of how much.
12	MR. SILVA: Well, the problem with
13	that, your Honor, is the company doesn't have
14	any money, but let me
15	JUDGE SIPPEL: They're going to
16	give you a future's contract.
17	MR. SILVA: I want to make two
18	points. One, first of all, whether or not Mr.
19	Waugh is entitled to this beneficial interest.
20	Mr. Austin stated under oath at his deposition
21	that he was entitled to it. That this
22	agreement has been in existence for a long

Mr. Bishop and Mr. Waugh both signed a settlement agreement, which we presented to the Bureau back in July of 2008, where they agreed that the company would issue stock to the voting trust, so, you know, I think that is important to take into account.

JUDGE SIPPEL: Is that settlement agreement, is that one of the exhibits to

something there that I got?

MR. SILVA: I can provide it to you, but it's, it's been referred to.

MS. SINGH: I believe so, your Honor, that it might have been an exhibit to the settlement fact statement that was filed by Preferred Communication Systems, Inc. It's possible that they had submitted that as an attachment to their proposal, but that was actually, or to their settlement fact statement, but that proposal to which Mr. Waugh's counsel refers, is something that our understanding, the Bureau's understanding, and

I invite Mr. Guskey and Mr. Austin to please 1 2 jump in if your Honor permits, something that 3 Preferred Communication Systems, Inc. offered to Mr. Waugh as an inducement to get him to 4 5 negotiate a universal settlement which was the 6 Enforcement Bureau's preferred outcome for settling this case. 7 8 In other words, Preferred went 9 along with the universal settlement idea that 10 the Enforcement Bureau was most interested in 11 by trying to get Mr. Waugh to the negotiating 12 table and presenting this position even though 13 it was aware from informal conversations predating that settlement offer that the 14 15 Enforcement Bureau would not accept such a 16 settlement offer. They did it to get Mr. 17 Waugh to the table. And please, Preferred, 18 jump in if you disagree. 19 MR. GUSKEY: Yes, this is --MR. SILVA: Well, wait a minute. 20 21 JUDGE SIPPEL: Well, wait, wait

just a second. Let Mr. Silva get back on this

1	one.
2	MR. SILVA: I mean the point is,
3	your Honor, ~~
4	JUDGE SIPPEL: We'll get to you,
5	sir.
6	MR. SILVA: The parties have been
7	negotiating settlement. Preferred and Waugh
8	have been negotiating, the Bureau has been
9	negotiating, but my point is this particular
10	issue of compensation to Mr. Waugh and what
11	form it takes and how much he's entitled to is
12	a private contractual dispute.
13	JUDGE SIPPEL: That's I
14	MR. SILVA: And it has nothing to
15	do, and should have nothing to do, with the
16	settlement in this case, except the Bureau
17	says, well, there's an appearance here of
18	something amiss that he had the voting trust
19	and it was there was an appearance of a
20	sham behind the fact that he was a felon and

that by allowing this whole thing to recur

would, I guess, deserve the public interest,

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but what the Bureau is failing to say here is they don't have to rely on appearances anymore.

They've adduced what the facts are in the course of discovery. And the facts are that the voting trust was a result of Communication's counsel advising Mr. Waugh that you have been convicted of a felony and you cannot hold an attributable interest in a commission licensee and this is the only way you can do this. You have to set up a voting trust. You can be a consultant, but you cannot be a principal.

And that is what happened, and that's what Mr. Austin and Mr. Waugh over the years I mean, the record is very clear, that it was going to be the vehicle for Mr. Waugh's interest. And there isn't anything wrong with this.

And moreover, as far all these alleged misrepresentations against Preferred because they didn't disclose Mr. Waugh wasn't

the beneficiary of a nonvoting trust, they 1 He's not an attributable 2 don't have to. 3 owner. His, his felony conviction is in 4 fact not relevant to whether Preferred was 5 qualified or not. And I think they're finally 6 conceding that now in some of the pleadings 7 that they've recently submitted. 8 point is why is this of concern to the 9 Commission? 10 It's a private contractual matter. 11 It's being litigated. The whole settlement 12 should not hinge on what Mr. Waugh's interest 13 14 should be or how much he should get. 15 JUDGE SIPPEL: I'm delighted to hear you say it that way. I was under the 16 impression that Mr. Waugh was the one that was 17 nolding out to have this compensation issue 18 19 resolved before he would agree to enter into this, this universal settlement. 20 MR. SILVA: But the settlement says 21 -- it, of course, takes sides, your Honor. He 22

1 can't go to court and try to vindicate his 2 interest here when the FCC and the company has 3 agreed not to ever give him this stock. mean that is taking sides in the deal. 4 The 5 settlement agreement says Preferred will never 6 issue any equity interest to Mr. Waugh. 7 JUDGE SIPPEL: Unless well. what's missing there is unless, unless awarded 8 9 by a court of jurisdiction with all appeals 1.0 resolved. What's wrong with that? 11 MS. SINGH: Well, your Honor, let me just put it this way. 12 Mr. Waugh was 13 affirmatively requesting that the voting trust 14 and stock be created and issued as part and 15 parcel of the settlement. That's on pages two 16 to three of the July 8, 2009 letter of which 17 the Bureau just provided your Honor a copy. 18 It was attached to Mr. Waugh's settlement fact 19 statement. 20 Therefore, Mr. Waugh's position, 21 at least as of July 8, 2009, and when he did 22 not repudiate despite the Bureau's invitation

1	on July 31, 2009 to revisit his settlement
2	position if at all there were any change to it
3	
4	- MR. SILVA: Counsel, I for you.
5	JUDGE SIPPEL: Let let
6	MR. SILVA: Are you saying that
7	from the beginning, you did not impose a
8	condition on Mr. Waugh?
9	MR. OSHINSKY: You are framing the
10	question the way you want. Let Ms. Singh
11	finish. Observe some decorum.
12	MR. SILVA: All right.
13	JUDGE SIPPEL: We have to finish
14	questions really now
15	MS. SINGH: Thank you, your Honor.
16	JUDGE SIPPEL: We'll take a break
17	if you want to take a break.
18	MS. SINGH: Your Honor, if that's
19	something that you'd like or if you believe
20	that counsel
21	JUDGE SIPPEL: Why don't we do
22	that?

MS. SINGH: Okay. 1 JUDGE SIPPEL: Why don't we take a 2 ten-minute break? I think things are a little 3 bit too, too high here. The motion has gotten 4 5 Let's take a ten-minute break to too high. cool off. 6 the above-entitled 7 (Whereupon, matter went off the record at 10:59 a.m. and 8 resumed at 11:13 a.m.) 9 JUDGE SIPPEL: Okay, where did we 10 leave off? I really I want to just again ask 11 the question. I really -- I'm -- if -- I 12 13 Mr. Silva is right. If this is agree. nothing more than a contract dispute about 14 compensation that you say is, that is either 15 16 in court or it's going to be in court, why are we, why does the Bureau care about it? 17 MS. SINGH: Your Honor, the Bureau 18 doesn't care what form of compensation Mr. 19 Waugh gets adjudicated and is entitled to in 20 the form of anything other than stock. As we 21

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1	designation of stock to him even through a
2	voting trust gets back to the very fact
3	pattern that caused the Commission to
4	designate this case for a hearing.
5	JUDGE SIPPEL: I understand, but
6	what I'm hearing I'm just, you know,
7	picking up on what I'm hearing today,
8	apparently, and I'm hearing this also from Mr.
9	Austin and, and Mr. Guskey. I want to be sure
10	I got this name right, sir. It's Guskey or
11	Guskey, Guskey.
12	MR. GUSKEY: It's Guskey, yes.
13	JUDGE SIPPEL: They would use some,
14	some very, some kind of a stock standard to
15	work up some kind of a formula, I guess stock
16	performance on a formula, but it would all end
17	up, it would all come out to being cash. And
18	if that's the case, no?
19	MR. SILVA: Your Honor, that has
20	not been that would not be acceptable to
21	Mr. Waugh.
22	JUDGE SIPPEL: Well, that's what I

MR. SILVA: Well, --2 JUDGE SIPPEL: -- Mr. Guskey --3 MR. SILVA: That was something that 4 was negotiated. It was a subject of a 5 б negotiation. We tried to come up with some contract, some future interest, and it just 7 So, and that's when, one the didn't work. 8 9 reasons Mr. Waugh wrote this, or I wrote the letter on behalf of Mr. Waugh July 8, stating 10 that he wanted what he was promised, the stock 11 to be issued to this trust, which has been 12 13 formed by the way. And the trust agreement 14 has been in existence. it was really 15 It's not that, formality that prevented it from being formed. 16 And that's, that's our position that if he is 17 a non-attributable owner and he gets this 18 stock through the voting trust, how much and 19 20 so forth really is a private contractual 21 matter? And that conditioning the whole 22

I thought I heard --

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heard.